BN: Trade
Showing posts with label Trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trade. Show all posts

7 Sept 2020

Don't Believe the Economic Pessimists - Barokong

Source: Wall Street Journal
No matter who wins Tuesday’s presidential election, now ought to be the time that policy makers in Washington come together to tackle America’s greatest economic problem: sclerotic growth. The recession ended more than seven years ago. Unemployment has returned to normal levels. Yet gross domestic product is rising at half its postwar average rate. Achieving better growth is possible, but it will require deep structural reforms.

The policy worthies have said for eight years: stimulus today, structural reform tomorrow. Now it’s tomorrow, but novel excuses for stimulus keep coming...

Keep reading here, the Wall Street Journal Oped. I'll post the whole thing in 30 days as usual.

Somehow the WSJ thinks anyone is interested in growth and serious policy on the eve of the election. Or maybe they were just tired of Trump vs. Clinton and needed to fill space.  At any rate, it might give you a little reprieve from the election coverage.

16 Aug 2020

Blueprint for America - Barokong

Some of the inspiration for this project came from the remarkable 1980 memo (here) to President-elect Ronald Reagan from his Coordinating Committee on Economic Policy.

Like that memo, this is a book about governance, not politics.  It's not partisan -- copies are being sent to both campaigns. It's not about choosing or spinning policies to attract voters or win elections.

The book is about long-term policies and policy frameworks -- how policy is made, return to rule of law, is as important as what the policy is --  that can fix America's problems. It focuses on what we think are the important issues as well as policies to address those issues -- it does not address every passion of the latest two-week news cycle.

The book comprises the answers we would give to an incoming Administration of any party, or incoming Congress, if they asked us for a policy package that is best for the long-term welfare of the country.

The chapters, to whet your appetite:

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: The Domestic Landscape by Michael J. Boskin

IN BRIEF: Spending by George P. Shultz

CHAPTER 2: Entitlements and the Budget by John F. Cogan

CHAPTER 3: A Blueprint for Tax Reform by Michael J. Boskin

CHAPTER 4: Transformational Health Care Reform by Scott W. Atlas

CHAPTER 5: Reforming Regulation by Michael J. Boskin

CHAPTER 6: National and International Monetary Reform by John B. Taylor

CHAPTER 7: A Blueprint for Effective Financial Reform by John H. Cochrane

IN BRIEF: National Human Resources by George P. Shultz

CHAPTER 8: Education and the Nation’s Future by Eric A. Hanushek

CHAPTER 9: Trade and Immigration by John H. Cochrane

IN BRIEF: A World Awash in Change

CHAPTER 10: Restoring Our National Security by James O. Ellis Jr., James N. Mattis, and Kori Schake

CHAPTER 11: Redefining Energy Security by James O. Ellis Jr.

CHAPTER 12: Diplomacy in a Time of Transition by James E. Goodby

CLOSING NOTE: The Art and Practice of Governance by George P. Shultz

My chapter on a Blueprint for Effective Financial Reform is a better version of the talk on Equity Financed banking which I posted here. (The talk was based on the paper. Now you have the paper.)

My chapter on Trade and Immigration is new, and an uncompromising red-meat free-market view. I don't think one should compromise centuries old economic understanding just because it's not politically popular at the moment.

If you got this far, you might also be interested in my Economic Growth essay written for a parallel but similar project.

11 Aug 2020

Immigration, trade, and child care - Barokong

Both Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton want to lower the cost and, presumably, increase the amount of child care. A quick economics quiz: What is the policy change that would have the greatest such effect?

I hope you answered: legal immigration of child care workers! And remove the large number of restrictions on providing child care.  As the WSJ points out in a recenteditorial,

... regulation drives up the cost of care. States set minimums on square feet per child; licensing requirements; ratios for staff-to-children; group sizes. Zoning laws prevent care centers in convenient places such as residential neighborhoods. Regulation also limits options like informal care at grandma’s house or families who share nannies.
On the latter, zoning, for example, forbids commercial activity in residential-zoned areas, like the ones where people live. And WSJ left out the full weight of American labor law and taxation. Anyone who has tried to legally hire a nanny has a good sense of that. (See alsoIvanka Trump's oped  describing the plan.)

Needless to say, that is not the candidates' preferred approach, who were vying with each other to offer federal subsidies. Mr. Trump is, needless to say, simultaneously vowing to deport large number of child-care workers. Mrs Clinton is not making any noises about removing legal restrictions or taxes on low-skill part time employment. (The WJS offers that "Mr. Trump deserves credit for noting" the above comments on regulation, but did not offer a link. If anyone knows where this is, put it in a comment, as I had not heard about it.)

A lot of economics comes down to: Supply competition is the best answer to just about every economic problem.

This is a small example of a spreading disease in American economic policy. The recipe: 1) introduce strong supply and competition restrictions, usually to politically favored groups. Soon, however, those groups start charging higher prices. So 2) give subsidies so people can pay the higher prices induced by 1). It's perfect: now both sides depend on politicians. See, most egregiously, health care and housing.

The trouble is, you can only make one thing (child care, now) cheaper by making everything else more expensive. A tax credit for child care means higher taxes on everything else. We're running out of everything elses fast!

This is a good moment for supply and demand, and a good illustration of how this basic economic tool gives insights that are not obvious.

(If you can't see the supply and demand graph, try here.)  Demand slopes down. The less child care costs, the more of it people buy.  Supply curve slopes up. If child care workers can charge more, more people take those jobs or set up child care businesses.

The red graph shows what happens if we allow lots of immigration, and also deregulate supply. The supply curve shifts to the right -- more child care offered at the same price. Moreover, if we allow immigration, the supply curve becomes flatter -- a smaller increase in price produces a larger increase in the amount of child care.

There is a very important distinction between domestic and international supply. In the end, the US workforce is limited. The more people who go in to child care, the fewer do something else. The upward slope of the child-care supply curve represents an inward shift of the supply curves of everything else, meaning higher prices and lower quantities. Immigration gives us a free upward slope.

This graph analyzes a federal subsidy for child care. If people get a $100 subsidy, they are willing to pay $100 more for the same amount of child care, so the demand curve goes up by $100, as shown. I drew the supply curves with more extreme slopes, to make a deeper point.

The "restricted" supply curve is nearly vertical. This is what happens in an industry with strong supply restrictions, like, say, epi-pens. The subsidy means people are willing to pay $100 more. With no more supply forthcoming, the result is simply that people pay $100 more and get the same quantity.

Subsidizing something with restricted supply does not benefit consumers. It just raises the price and benefits the producers.

The consumers, unaware of what's going on, become dependent on the subsidy of course. See health care and education.

With lots of supply competition, and a flat supply curve, the subsidy instead raises the quantity of child care delivered, which is presumably what both Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Trump desire from the policy. A subsidy only increases quantities if there is lots of supply competition and easy entry.

The journal gets this

Mrs. Clinton raises the Trump offer in every regard, from more Head Start funding to salary support for day-care workers. And if you think care is expensive now, wait until Mrs. Clinton wades in. She likes to say that child care can be more expensive than college tuition, which is false. The irony is that her day-care blowout would recreate what has made college notoriously expensive—large subsidies for the provider and buyer. Day-care centers and pre-Ks could raise prices, confident that government will cover the increase.
The graph offers a little more precision. Subsidies only raise college expenses because of restricted supply. The Administration's war on for profit colleges unambiguously pushes the supply curve to the left.

On the human side of our immigration restrictions, I recommend a beautiful New Yorker article by Rachel Aviv on the life of a woman who immigrated illegally from the Phillippines to care for the children of... well, people like the Trumps and Clintons. The US will not kick out illegal immigrants because deep down we know that without them the cost of child care will skyrocket. But the cost to a low-wage worker of illegal status -- never being able to see family again -- is worth remembering.

The New Yorker article makes clear also how much immigration to the US is driven by desperate conditions elsewhere. If you don't want immigration to the US, the best possible solution is to aggressively buy what other countries have to sell, so people can make a living there. Needless to say, neither Mr. Trump nor Mrs. Clinton seem at all aware of this obvious connection.

(Vaguely competent foreign policy is the second best possible solution. Refugees from Syria and Honduras would not be coming here if we had not let their country fall apart, or fueled a drug war.)

Most child care is not Mrs. Trump, handing off children to a loving nanny in Manhattan as she speeds off to her job as.. whatever it is she does. Tellingly, the Trump plan takes the form of a tax credit and a new addition to the bewildering number of tax sheltered savings vehicles. What, doesn't everyone have a tax lawyer? A lot of child care is done off the books, for people who also work off the books.  This is also a good moment to reflect on the wisdom of the new ban-cash movement plus e-verify so that every single transaction in the US is taxed and appropriately monitored for compliance with labor laws, licensing, OSHA, and so on...

10 Aug 2020

EconTalk - Barokong

As in other recent projects (growth essay,testimony) I'm trying to synthesize, and also to find policies and ways to talk about them that avoid the stale left-right debate, where people just shout base-pleasing spin ever louder. "You're a tax and spend socialist" "You just want tax cuts for your rich buddies" is getting about as far as "You always leave your socks on the floor" "Well, you spend the whole day on the phone to your mother."

We did this as an interview before a live audience, at a Chicago Booth alumni event held at Hoover, so it's a bit lighter than the usual EconTalk. This kind of thought helps the synthesis process a lot for me.  Russ' pointed questions make me think, as did the audience in follow up Q&A (not recorded). Plus, it was fun.

I always leave any interview full of regrets about things I could have said better or differently. The top of the regret pile here was leaving a short joke in response to Russ' question about what the government should spend more on. Russ was kindly teeing up the section of thegrowth essay "there is good spending" and perhaps "spend more to spend less" ideas in several other recent writings. It would have been a good idea to go there and spend a lot more time on the question.

From the growth essay, I think the government could profitably spend a lot more money on the justice system. That so many of our fellow citizens rot in jail awaiting trials, that the vast majority never receive a trial anyway but a hasty plea-bargain, that their legal representation is so thin, is a disgrace -- and causing huge problems. If a wrongly accused young man spends two years in jail before charges are dropped, the consequences for him and his family are awful. Business relies on a speedy and efficient justice system to adjudicate commercial disputes, and that seems to be falling apart too, partly for lack of resources.  The cost here is peanuts compared to, say, peanut subsidies.

Our public infrastructure doesn't just consist of steel and asphalt. The public software needs investment as well, or more.

Public health is one of the most essential public goods. Of all the civilization-ending scenarios you can think of, nuclear war and a pandemics top my list. Many past pandemics followed a surge in globalization -- the plague of the 1350s, that wiped out half or more of the population; the smallpox that wiped out native America in the 1500s, the 1918 flu. (Larry Summers has a good article on this point.) We are ripe for antibiotics to stop working and new diseases to spread catastrophically, if not among humans among the plants and animals on which we depend. Don't count on the UN and the WHO.

The government can profitably fund basic research. "Yes, 95% of funded research is silly. Yes, the government allocates money inefficiently. Yes, research should also attract private donations. But the 5% that is not silly is often vital, and can produce big breakthroughs." (Basic research is not the same thing as subsidies for commercializing research.)

Yes, Martha, I should have said, there are public goods here and there.

Of course, more spending on things like these does not imply more spending overall. They're all remarkably cheap, and could easily be funded by spending a little less on some of the colossal waste. (Example: We spend $6 billion on the FBI and $13 billion on border control.) Of course, one must also spend wisely and use the results wisely. And one could add a lot to the list. But repeating a fun joke about spending is not the right answer.

5 Aug 2020

Carrier Commentary - Barokong

When Paul Krugman, Larry Summers,  Sarah Palin, and the Wall Street Journal all agree on something -- that presidential deal-making and strong-arming over plant location is a terrible idea -- it's worth paying attention to.

I think Tyler Cowen did the best job of describing what's wrong with the deal, interviewed on NPR. (Transcript, Highlights and audio link).

(This is an impressive radio interview. I long to be able to express something that quickly clearly and coherently on radio. Tyler must have really prepared hard for it.)

INSKEEP: Don Evans says this is a way for the president-elect to send a strong message to workers and to corporations about what his priorities are. What's wrong with that?

TYLER COWEN: We're supposed to live under a republic of the rule of law. Not the rule of man. This deal is completely non-transparent. And the notion that every major American company has to negotiate person-to-person with the president over Twitter is going to make all business decisions politicized.

INSKEEP: What do you mean it's nontransparent, first of all?

COWEN: We don't know exactly what the company is getting. There's plenty of talk that the reason Carrier went along with the deal was because they were afraid their parent company would lose a lot of defense contracts. So this now creates the specter of a president always being willing to punish or reward companies depending on whether or not they give him a good press release.

INSKEEP: Why don't you explain to me the thing about the parent company, which is United Technologies?

COWEN: Yes, they do a lot of defense contracting. It's at least 10 percent of their revenue. Carrier, from the state of Indiana, was already offered the tax break before the election. They turned it down. Now, all of a sudden, Trump is President. Bernie Sanders is telling Trump to threaten the defense contract of the parent company, and now, all of a sudden, the company takes the deal. And Trump is known for being somewhat vindictive. This, to me, is scary. It indicates an environment where business decisions are now about how much you please the president.

INSKEEP: Now, you just said an interesting thing. Bernie Sanders, a socialist of the Democratic Party, did, a few days before the deal was announced, say that Trump ought to use the leverage of the defense contracts to get United Technologies to change its behavior. We don't know on a factual basis that's actually what happened, but - but you're noting that this is kind of a leftist thing to do.

COWEN: That's correct. Trump and Bernie Sanders, for all of their populist talk, their are actual recipes in both cases lead to crony capitalism.

INSKEEP: What's crony capitalism?

COWEN: Crony capitalism is a system where businesses who are in bed with the government and who give the president positive press releases are rewarded and where companies who oppose or speak out against the president are, in some way, punished.

INSKEEP: David Wessel of the Brookings Institution said on our air the other day that this act reminded him of something that is done from time to time in France - under the socialist government in France. And I'm also thinking of Venezuela, where the late President Hugo Chavez would go on TV and denounce companies and demand that companies do specific things. And of course, the economy there has ended up being a complete mess. Is that - is that a fair comparison at all?

COWEN: Well, we're not close to that point yet, but we're taking baby steps in that direction. And the way you avoid getting to that point is by having people speak out when they see the baby steps.

INSKEEP: If the president-elect gets results, at least some of the jobs - at least for now - are staying in Indiana. Does it really matter how he does it?

COWEN: Well, keep in mind the broader numbers. Since the year 2000, Indiana has lost 150,000 manufacturing jobs. And this, at best, assuming all goes well, saves a thousand of those. So to actually make a dent in the problem, jawboning isn't the way to do it. It's changing economic incentives and making it more cost-effective to hire people in the United States. And none of this really does that. (If it's not obvious one could add, 1) Every million dollars of tax break Carrier gets to stay in Indiana is a million dollars someone else has to pay instead -- likely a smaller company that hires more people. 2) If the US could, in fact, take jobs back from Mexico, then each such job taken back is one more Mexican who wants to migrate to the US. 3) Capital and current accounts add up. If carrier invests $1 M in Mexico, then US exports must increase by $1M. And vice versa. 4) If it's profitable to build air conditioners in Mexico, then someone else will do it and that Carrier plant is toast anyway.)

Brooks and Shields

Who will defend President-Elect Trump? Surprisingly, Mark Shields, in a very interesting Shields and  Brooks segment on the PBS newshour.

First David Brooks did a great job of slamming the deal, as Cowen did

The job of government is to be a level playing field where companies compete and make money honestly. And by rewarding one company over another, by getting involved in these sort of petty deals, the first thing you’re doing is encouraging rent-seeking, for companies to make money off government, rather than the honest way.
And the second thing, it’s — and especially in this administration, it’s an invitation to corruption. If you’re cutting deals with company after company, doing this kind of deal, that kind of deal, inevitably, there is going to be a quid pro quo. There is going to be under-the-table lobbying.
And it’s just a terrible precedent for our economy and for the administration.
But that's easy. Shields, the "left" commenter, had the harder job, defending Trump's action:

I think it is bad public policy. I think it’s a political masterstroke. I think Donald Trump raised this issue during the campaign. When it first appeared, when Carrier showed the gross insensitivity, where it was on YouTube, where they went in and told the 1,000 workers that their jobs were leaving, that the company was leaving, and it was just — it was abjectly insensitive to the workers. And Donald Trump picked that up. It was part of his prairie populism of the time, unlike his Cabinet appointments to Treasury and Commerce.
And I think Donald Trump, this is a masterstroke that he said he would do something, he did it, and it’s been a long time since the president of the United States has made that kind of an announcement.
Is it a coherent national macro-policy? No. But as a micro-act, it’s a very positive act politically. And I think it reflects better upon him and his commitment to these people and their well-being and their survival than an awful lot that’s happened in the past.
I'm almost -- but not quite -- convinced. Shields' narrow window of hope is that this was a one-off, rather brilliant symbolic political act, and that now the Trump administration will focus on serious policy, which mostly means bringing rule of law back to regulation and eliminating interference of this sort.

Yes, presidential politics is not ivory tower economics, and occasionally Presidents have to do something abjectly wrong to garner support for a greater purpose. It's a delicate and dangerous act though -- if this is where we're going, early in an administration is the best time to do some hard things, set in motion policies that actually work, set a high bar against demands for cronyist payouts, and trust that four years of good policy will pay off.

The best hope in this direction is for the President to score some points, and for a loud chorus of serious policy people, from left and right, to denounce any more moves in this direction. This is exactly what has happened.  Really, it gives one great hope that just about every commentator left and right says this is not the way to go.

Shields and Brooks are also nicely consistent. Shields:

I give Barack Obama great credit for the rescue of the United States automobile industry. It saved hundreds of thousands of jobs.
Unlike, say, Paul Krugman, who has been madly tweeting (correctly) that Carrier is bad policy -- but the same thing done by Democratic administrations such as the auto bailout are of course fantastic ideas.

Peggy Noonan

I was most disappointed in Peggy Noonan, usually excellent, in the Wall Street Journal, and approving of the deal for all the wrong reasons: to her it wasn't just a little political pandering thank you, but the path forward

This is called economic nationalism but whatever its name it suggests a Republicanism in new accord with the needs of the moment...
She went on to tell the story of a related Kennedy escapade. Excerpts:

It was 1961 and the new president, John F. Kennedy, had been trying to signal to big business that they could trust him.. His impulses were those of a moderate of his era: show budgetary constraint, keep costs and prices down, prevent inflation.....

That September Kennedy asked the industry to forgo a price increase. He asked the steelworkers union for wage demands... Early in 1962 his labor secretary, Arthur Goldberg, put together a deal. In the spring the union and the steel companies accepted it. Everyone understood the industry would not raise prices.

A few days later Roger Blough, chairman of the board of mighty U.S. Steel, asked to see the president. He handed him a four-page mimeographed statement announcing his company would raise steel prices $6 a ton. ...

Soon Bethlehem Steel raised its prices. Other companies followed.

Now Kennedy was enraged. Accepting Blough’s decision would undo all his wage-price guideposts. It would also constitute a blow to the prestige of the presidency. And labor would never trust him again.

So he went to war. At a news conference the next day he called the steel companies’ actions “a wholly unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of the public interest” by “a tiny handful of steel executives whose pursuit of private power and profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility.” He implied they were unpatriotic in a time of national peril. ...

Kennedy ordered the Defense Department to shift its steel purchases from U.S. Steel to companies that hadn’t raised prices. The Justice Department under Attorney General Robert Kennedy launched an antitrust investigation, summoned a federal grand jury, and sent FBI agents to the homes and offices of steel executives. There were rumors of threats of IRS investigations of expense accounts and hotel bills. (my emphasis)

Bethlehem Steel was the first to back down. A week after informing the president of the price increase, Roger Blough returned to the White House to surrender... I emphasized the paragraph of actions that Kennedy took. Each measure is blatantly illegal and an abuse of power. If you think abuse of the regulatory state and prosecutorial power for political purposes are new dangers, let this remind you just how far back it goes.

Curiously, Peggy seems to get that.

It was a big win for Kennedy but it was a bloody affair, and on some level he knew it. His relations with business never quite recovered. The administration’s brutality left a stain. Robert Kennedy’s ruthlessness inspired the anti-nepotism law that is said, these days, to bedevil the Trump family. A nascent, national conservative movement was embittered and emboldened: Barry Goldwater said JFK was trying to “socialize the business of the country,” and decided soon after to run against him.
... presidents shouldn’t abuse their power—and he did. They especially can’t do it to shore up their own political position, and he did that, too.
So how does she justify it?

But it’s also true he thought he was right on the policy and that the policy would benefit the American people.
And the American people could tell. His approval ratings, high then, stayed high. People appreciate energy in the executive when they suspect it’s being harnessed for the national good. The key is to wield it wisely and with restraint. But yes, a little muscle judiciously applied can be a unifying thing.
No, Peggy.  Crucially, he was wrong on the policy. No, we do not fight inflation by jawboning companies and unions not to raise prices. That does not "benefit the American people." This isn't fancy economics. Leaders from Emperor  Diocletian to Nicolás Maduro have tried to quell inflation by muscling businesses -- sending police to terrorize businessmen in their homes -- not to raise prices, and it always ends with more muscle and more inflation -- as Kennedy's did.

He may have "thought" he was right. His Keynesian advisers had also forgotten lessons of two thousand years of history and thought jawboning an excellent idea. But this is precisely why we have a rule of law -- so that leaders who "think" they are right about the proper level of steel prices cannot wreck the economy.

Just as Trump's action is abjectly wrong on policy. For just as many thousands of years, leaders have been cutting Carrier-like deals, to just as contrary effect. It is our duty to say that, to undercut the political popularity that presidents can gain by counterproductive policies, especially when the means trample the rule of law.

"a Republicanism in new accord with the needs of the moment" is a Republicanism that works. And the point of "work" is not just to win the next election, or give people things that feel good but impoverish them. The need of the moment is leadership, to channel people's well deserved anger into a productive direction.

I hope Peggy will someday write a piece titled, "the worst sentence I ever wrote," in honor of

"A little muscle judiciously applied can be a unifying thing,"
especially when the "unification" comes by feeding people falsehoods like Carrier deals save jobs, or jawboning lowers inflation.  Just how does this not describe Castro? Or Chavez? Or...well, fill in the blanks.

31 Jul 2020

Immigration and trade - Barokong

Question: What is an easy way to reduce immigration in to the US (if you want to do that)?

Answer: Buy what they have to sell. If they can make good money at home, they are less likely to want to come here.

Question: Won't we lose jobs?

Answer: What do you think people do with the dollars we send them in return for foreign goods? There is only one thing to do with dollars -- buy American goods,  invest in American companies, or buy US government debt, and the government spends it.

Question: But what about those jobs moving overseas?

Answer: Some jobs do move overseas. But those dollars, flowing back, create new jobs in the US. There are losers. It is true. There are also winners. That is also undeniable. Trade restrictions basically transfer jobs from some people in the US -- new jobs in export-oriented industries or industries fueled by foreign investment demand --  to other people in the US -- old jobs. And they do so inefficiently, making Americans buy more expensive goods overall.

Question: What's another way to reduce immigration in to the US (if you want to do that)?

Answer: Help their homes to be peaceful as well as prosperous. The costs of feckless foreign policy are not just lives and countries ruined, refugees washing up on our and europe's shores, but electoral and political responses.

(Economists. Forgive me for using the misleading "create jobs" rhetoric, in the interest of connecting with non economists. You know what I mean -- create wages, opportunities, businesses, etc.)

Summers on Trade - Barokong

Larry Summers has an excellent FT column, "Revoking trade deals will not help American middle classes." (If you can't access FT, these usually show up eventually onLarry's blog)

The key point: whatever you think of the impact of trade and globalization, trade deals are not responsible for stagnating "middle class" wages.

...the idea that past trade agreements have damaged the American middle class and that the prospective Trans-Pacific Partnership would do further damage is now widely accepted in both major US political parties.
... the idea that the US trade agreements of the past generation have impoverished to any significant extent is absurd.
There is a debate to be had about the impact of globalisation on middle class wages and inequality. Increased imports have displaced jobs...
My judgment is that these effects are considerably smaller than the impacts of technological progress...
But an assessment of the impact of trade on wages is very different than an assessment of trade agreements. It is inconceivable that multilateral trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, have had a meaningful impact on US wages and jobs for the simple reason that the US market was almost completely open 40 years ago before entering into any of the controversial agreements.
...The irrelevance of trade agreements to import competition becomes obvious when one listens to the main arguments against trade agreements. They rarely, if ever, take the form of saying we are inappropriately taking down US trade barriers.
Rather the naysayers argue that different demands should be made on other countries during negotiations - on issues including intellectual property, labour standards, dispute resolution or exchange rate manipulation....
In other words, the US was open already in the postwar period. Trade deals ask other countries to take down trade barriers in specific markets, and also to make internal changes, for the US to remain open.

The reason for the rise in US imports is not reduced trade barriers. Rather it is that emerging markets are indeed emerging. They are growing in their economic potential because of successful economic reforms and greater global integration.
These developments would have occurred with or without US trade pacts, though the agreements have usually been an impetus to reform. Indeed, since the US does very little to reduce trade barriers in our agreements, the impetus to reform is most of what foreign policymakers value in them along with political connection to the US.
Trade deals are very useful for many countries, including the U.S. When politicians get demands for subsidies, protection, stifling regulation, or lack of needed regulation, they can point to the trade agreement. That's a good argument for multilateral agreements as well -- look at the broad range of countries that has agreed to behave, not just look at our special deal with one country.

The truth too often denied by both sides in this debate is that incremental agreements like TPP have been largely irrelevant to the fate of middle class workers. The real strategic choice Americans face is whether the objective of their policies is to see the economies of the rest of the world grow and prosper. Or, does the US want to keep the rest of the world from threatening it by slowing global growth and walling off products and people?

Framed this way the solution appears obvious. A strategy of returning to the protectionism of the past and seeking to thwart the growth of other nations is untenable and would likely lead to a downward spiral in the global economy. The right approach is to maintain openness while finding ways to help workers at home who are displaced by technical progress, trade or other challenges. If it works, protection only enriches some Americans at the expense of foreigners and other Americans.  It is a negative-sum game. If you do not think America's role in the world is to try to send a billion Chinese and Indians back to grinding poverty, to benefit a bit selected American workers and businesses, then you ought not to be a fan.

Larry focuses on the TPP, but the trade agenda is now much larger -- a substantial increase in US trade restrictions, including a return to tariffs, industry - by - industry quantative restrictions, even in violation of trade agreements, and so on.

Larry mentions protectionism in the past, but don't get all nostalgic. That was in the far past, last seen in the universally reviled Smoot-Hawley tariff of the Great Depression. Nobody looks back to that nostalgically as part of "Great" America.

Do read the wholeessay.

27 Jul 2020

Trade insight - Barokong

Daniel Hannan, a (soon to be unemployed?) UK member of the European Parliament, writes insightfully about trade in the Saturday Wall Street Journal.

It is telling that neither of the Obama administration’s flagship trade deals—the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, or TTIP, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership—even had “free trade” in the title. Although they had liberalizing elements, they also contained a great deal of corporatism.
Monitoring TTIP as a member of the European Parliament, I saw plainly enough what was going on: Big multinationals in Europe were getting together with big multinationals in the U.S. and lobbying for more regulation. By combining the most restrictive rules in the EU and the U.S., they aimed to raise barriers to entry and to give themselves an effective monopoly.
There is a deep point here. Our trade treaties have strong elements of managed mercantilism, not free trade, and can serve the interests of global corporations. There is a "better" trade that is also freer trade, and may address some of the political unpopularity of trade deals. Hannan has in mind a very open US-UK bilateral deal, but more deeply states clearly and concisely how better trade deals could work in general

A British-American deal should avoid that danger. How? By focusing on mutual product recognition rather than on common standards. If a drug is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, it should automatically be approved for sale in the U.K. If a trader can practice in the City of London, he should automatically be licensed to practice on Wall Street. And so on.
A commercial deal, in this case as in any other, should have nothing to do with human rights or child labor or climate change. Important as those issues are, they are separate from the free exchange of products.
... Once Britain no longer has to worry about the protectionism of French filmmakers, Italian textile manufacturers and the rest, we should reach a comprehensive agreement covering services as well as goods. If we make sure that the resulting deal is in the interest of consumers rather than producers, we could revive the whole notion of free trade, which is something the world very much needs just now.

25 Jul 2020

Trade Haiku - Barokong

George Shultz and Martin Feldstein, in the Washington Post

If a country consumes more than it produces, it must import more than it exports. That’s not a rip-off; that’s arithmetic.
If we manage to negotiate a reduction in the Chinese trade surplus with the United States, we will have an increased trade deficit with some other country.
Federal deficit spending, a massive and continuing act of dissaving, is the culprit. Control that spending and you will control trade deficits.
That's not an excerpt, it's the whole thing. Someday, I will learn to be this concise.

9 Jul 2020

Duet Redux - Barokong

Another duet of headlines with an interesting lesson, both from the Wall Street Journal:

Solar power death wish

Suniva Inc., a bankrupt solar-panel maker, and German-owned SolarWorld Americas have petitioned the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) to impose tariffs on foreign-made crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells.
Solar cells in the U.S. sell for around 27 cents a watt. The petitioners want to add a new duty of 40 cents a watt. They also want a floor price for imported panels of 78 cents a watt versus the market price of 37 cents.
they’re resorting to Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 because they don’t need to show they are victims of dumping or foreign government subsidies. They only need to show that imports have harmed them
California Democrats Target Tesla

The United Automobile Workers are struggling for a presence in Tesla’s Fremont plant, and organized labor has called in a political favor.
Since 2010 California has offered a $2,500 rebate to encourage consumers to buy electric vehicles. But last week, at unions’ behest, Democrats introduced an amendment to cap-and-trade spending legislation that would require participating manufacturers to get a sign-off from the state labor secretary verifying that they are “fair and responsible in their treatment of workers.”
The legislation, which passed Friday, is a direct shot at Tesla. The Clean Vehicle Rebate Project has amounted to a $82.5 million subsidy for the company
Both moves ought to pose a liberal conundrum. If you want carbon reduction, you want cheap solar cells, so that more people will buy them. The planet does not care where the solar cells are produced. If you want electric cars, you want cheap electric cars so that more people will buy them.

But those who falsely sold green energy as a job producer, a boon to the economy; not a costly alternative to fossil fuels, a cost that must be borne to save the planet, now face this conundrum.

The deeper lesson here is the corrosive nature of subsidies and protection. Once the government starts subsidizing solar cells and electric cars, there is a quite natural force demanding access to the subsidies. Why should the owners of the Tesla company get largesse from the taxpayers, and not their workers too?

Solar cells are just the latest embodiment of the infant industry fallacy -- that protection from competition will allow an industry to grow and become competitive.  Instead, they become infantile industries, expert and getting protections and subsidies not producing cheap solar cells.

The infrastructure paradox is similar. We need infrastructure. Yet federal contracting requirements, requirements for union workers and union wages, and everything else attracted to federal money being handed out, drive costs up to astronomical levels.

For energy, this is an abject lesson in the wisdom of a simple carbon (and methane) tax in place of all the subsidies and winner-and-loser-picking our government does. (Let's not fight about whether to do it. The point is if we want to restrict fossil fuels and subsidize a move to non-carbon energy, this is how to do it.) Subsidies and protection invite demands for subsidies and protection, not clean energy.

3 Jul 2020

Flowers not tariffs - Barokong

I wrote a little commentary on trade for The Hill, which they titled "The US should give China Flowers not Tariffs." Chocolates too.

Source: The Hill

(The facial expressions in the picture are priceless)

The US should Give China Flowers not Tariffs

Trump and Xi met, and declared a 90 day cease fire. Where will this end? It’s hard to forecast. Our commander in chief is less predictable than the stock market. But we can opine on what should happen. And we can look for interest — what is in everybody’s interest to have happen?

That answer is clear: Come to a quick deal, declare victory, and get back to work fixing real economic problems. China makes some commitments about intellectual property (reasonably good for both sides, though not as important as all the fuss makes it seem); China makes some promises to buy American goods (crony capitalist mercantilism, but it makes politicians feel good); the US announces the 25% tariffs are off the table. Both politicians announce a great triumph. In sum, roughly what happened with NAFTA. Better still, we could do some reciprocal opening: repeal the 25% tariff on pickup trucks, and our own restrictions on foreign investments.

Large additional tariffs would be terrible for the US economy. Tariffs are taxes. Traditionally anti-tax Republicans, fresh off a hard-won victory to lower corporate taxes, should get that. And these taxes are starting to bite. For just one example, GM’s decision to close car plants was not completely unaffected by the price of steel and aluminum needed to make cars. And the constant threat of tariffs is in some ways worse than tariffs themselves. Companies managing global supply chains need to know where and how to invest. Big uncertainty postpones those investments. The point of the corporate tax cut was to encourage companies to invest. The threat of tariffs undoes that incentive.

Big tariffs, with exemptions granted on a discretionary basis, are corrosive to our political system. The rest of the admirable deregulatory effort is trying to get government agencies out of this racket.

If it ever was true that China stole our jobs, that’s not today’s problem. With a 3.9% unemployment rate, employers can’t find enough qualified workers. Our economy needs efficiency and productivity to grow, not protection for some and high prices for others.

The US economy is doing well, but it’s an iffy time. When does the long expansion end and the next recession come? Storm clouds are gathering. The stock market is dribbling down. Auto sales, home prices and sales are softening. America remains waist-deep in debt. With split government, there will be no significant economic legislation legislation for the next two years, and the House will do everything they can to stymie the deregulation effort. A big disruption of trade and immigration is a self-inflicted wound at a bad time.

It’s an even iffier time for China. Be careful what you wish for. A major downturn in China, which could well lead to financial crisis, could be just the spark for a global recession.

What’s the long run goal? The right approach to trade is simple: zero tariffs or restrictions. Americans are free to buy from the cheapest and best supplier. Whether foreigners put in tariffs or not is irrelevant to that conclusion.

Trade is no different than new companies that can produce things cheaper or better. And just as hurtful to old companies and their workers, but we generally see that it’s unwise to stop innovation. Trade between countries is no different than trade between states, and we all recognize that tariffs between states are a terrible idea.

Any money that goes to China to buy goods must — must, this is arithmetic, not economics — come back. It just comes back to a less politically favored industry. To the extent that trade is “imbalanced,” that means China works hard, puts goods on boats, and takes our government bonds in return. Would we really be better off if we worked hard, put the fruits of our labor on boats, in exchange for Chinese government bonds?  Paper and promises are cheap.

If China wants to tax her citizens to subsidize goods for US consumers, the right answer is flowers, chocolates and a nice thank-you card, as you would for any gift. Even intellectual property protection is an iffy cause. Theft is bad. But if selling the technology isn’t worth the market access, US companies don’t have to do it. Moreover, much intellectual property protection is the right to just the kind of continuing profits that we bemoan at home, in the new worry about increasing monopoly. Just how enthusiastic are we about defending pharmaceutical companies’ right to charge whatever they want in the US for their intellectual property?

If one wants to help the US economy, effort is far best spent at home — fix health care, financial regulation, the obscene tax code, zoning, occupational licensing, labor laws and on and on. The rewards are infinitely larger than any imaginable benefit from trade threats.

US GDP per capita is $60,000. China’s is $9,000. The average American is more than six times better off than the average Chinese.  The air in Beijing is unbreathable. For the US to complain about China hurting us is like the captain of the football team complaining that a six grader cheated him out of lunch money.

Even in the best case, tariffs and trade restrictions are zero sum — they make the US better off by making China worse off. There is no case that they increase the size of the pie. In fact they make us all worse off. Is this America’s place in the world? Would we send in the marines to take wealth from Chinese people to benefit Americans? That’s the case for tariffs.

The idea that we can use tariffs to threaten China into freer trade is dangerous. It’s hard to credibly threaten to do something that hurts us, without denying that it does hurt us, and then getting trapped doing it. It took decades to get rid of the trade restrictions of the 1930s.

We should get a grip, set a standard for good self-interested free-trade behavior, and work with our allies to get China to obey the same rules. Such a China is far more likely to cooperate on security issues than one already at war with us over trade.

Update:

I left out lots of obvious pot shots. An obvious one: Sanctions on North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Russia,  and so forth are designed to.. reduce imports. So we are doing to ourselves exactly what we are doing to them.

Summers on China - Barokong

(Continues from my last post on China trade)

Larry Summers has a goodFinancial Times oped on the same subject, titled "Washington may bluster but cannot stifle the Chinese economy."  He puts well the point of my previous post:

At the heart of the US’s problem in defining an economic strategy towards China is the following awkward fact. Suppose China had been fully compliant with every trade and investment rule and had been as open to the world as the most open countries at its income level. China might have grown faster because it reformed more rapidly or it might have grown more slowly because of reduced subsidies or more foreign competition. But it is highly unlikely that its growth rate would have been altered by as much as 1 percentage point.
Equally, while some US companies might earn more profits operating in China [IP sharing requirements] and some job displacement in American manufacturing due to Chinese state subsidies may have occurred, it cannot be argued seriously that unfair Chinese trade practices have affected US growth by even 0.1 per cent a year.

Larry gives more voice to China critiques than I do, which is excellent. One should listen to what people are saying, understand their objectives, and if one disagrees on outcomes -- tariffs -- usually it is because one believes a common objective has a preferable means of achievement.

Yes, China misbehaves, to the annoyance mostly of producers in other countries and their mercantilist governments:

As above, China's misbehavior mostly hurts China -- just as India's and Venezuela's poor economic policies (to choose middle of the road and bottom of the barrel examples) mostly hurt them, not us, facts which the US thereby mostly ignores. Why bother with China? Well, really, only because it's big.

Yes, but again most of the world is like that. China is only a worry because it's big and still growing.

China is still a poor country. And, as long as China keeps its current economic system, it is doomed to middle income status.  But if you multiply even $20,000 per capita GDP (compared to US $60,000 per capita) -- a doubling of China -- by a billion capitas, you get a lot of GDP. That's a lot of total weight to throw around on the world stage.

Summers:

This is not to say that China is not a threat to the international order. It is a seismic event for the United States to be overtaken after a century as the world’s largest economy. If, as is plausible though far from certain, the United States loses its lead over the next decade in information technology, artificial intelligence and biotech, the trauma will be magnified.
On the latter, let us continue to remember the hysteria about Japan taking over circa 1990, and the USSR taking over circa 1935 until 1960. Large government directed industrial policy has never worked. (Perhaps unless the competitor (the US) squashed its own dynamism.) We have enough problems on the table today to worry about the vague future.

The former is the interesting question. What does the world look like with China middle income per capita but larger overall than the US?

Can the United States imagine a viable global economic system in 2050 in which its economy is half the size of the world’s largest? Could a political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like? While it might be unacceptable to the United States to be so greatly surpassed in economic scale, does it have the means to stop it? Can China be held down without inviting conflict?
These are hard questions without obvious answers. But that is no excuse for ignoring them and focusing only on short-run frustrations. China appears to be willing to accommodate the United States on specific trade issues as long as the United States accepts its right to flourish and grow, knowing that sheer weight of numbers will make it the clear world’s largest economy before long.
"Questions without obvious answers" is a very polite way of saying that trade warriors have not explained any answers to these questions either.

I have one. If you're worried about China growing in might, so that on total GDP it can afford more aircraft carriers than we have, even though each individual Chinese is poor; if you're worried that China's state-run system can surpass our mixed state and big company military development system in quality of its forces; if you're worried that China develops past ambitions to flex its' muscles in its backyard, a sort of Monroe doctrine; then there is only one answer: get US growth back on track and in a hurry. Let international competition spur us to greater things, not to a desire to keep the average Chinese person to $9,000 of GDP per capita and filthy air so we can continue to be the Big Guy in Town. Which tariffs cannot do, by the way, as Larry points out.

Let us remember that the EU has more total GDP than the US. And we want them to spend more on their military. Getting China to want to live like the EU seems like a much better long-term strategy  than stoking a cold-war III competition with China.

Summers

Trump, for all his failings, has China’s attention on economic issues in a way that eluded his predecessors. The question is whether he will be able to use his leverage to accomplish something important. That will depend on his ability to convince the Chinese that the United States is capable of taking yes for an answer, and on his willingness to go beyond small-bore commercialism.
Earlier

A workable approach would involve feasible objectives clearly conveyed and supported by carrots and sticks, along with a willingness to define and accept success.
And:

We can hope, but we should not hold our breath.
Indeed. And for good reason. A successful half-century geopolitical strategy is  unlikely to spring from the mind of one President or to be accomplished by his force of will alone.

Taylor on China and Trade and Ideas - Barokong

Tim Taylor, also reviewing Summers on China, makes a few excellent points.

Growth comes from within. Trade is not conquest.

The formula for economic growth is to invest in human capital, physical capital, and technology, in an economic environment that provides incentives for hard work, efficiency, and innovation. China has made dramatic changes in all of these areas, and they are the main drivers behind China's extraordinary economic growth in the last four decades, and its expectation of above-global-average growth heading into the future.
No matter your views of China's trade surplus, there's no sensible economic theory which suggests that China's trade surplus, which as a share of GDP is relatively small, is a major driver of China's growth....
Conversely, the US economy has not done a great job of investing in the fundamentals of economic growth.

The US once led the world in share of workers with higher education, but now it's middle-of-the-pack. The US is a low-saving economy, with low rates of investment in both private and public capital. US spending on research and development has been stagnant for years, while other countries have been expanding. Rates of business start-ups have been declining.  Mobility of US workers is down. Economic mobility between generations in the US is not high. Further, the US has made little progress--and little effort--to address ongoing issues like the projections of large and growing budget deficits, or rising health care costs, or a much higher level of income inequality than a few decades ago. (Just how redistribution to address inequality is gong to help growth, I will let Tim try to explain. Europe's experiments in paying people not to work are not inspiring.) Fallacies in trade thinking are many and subtle -- good for Tim for noticing this one.

Best of all, Tim thinks about the question, how does the world look when countries like China, and (hopefully) India and Brazil continue to catch up, achieving at least middle income GDP per capita, but multiplied by millions of capitas, add up to more GDP overall than the US.

I lack the geopolitical imagination to see how this shift will play out. But at a small scale, you can see it at the movies, when you see a rising number of roles for Chinese actors and settings in China. It tells you that the international market for movies is becoming ever-more important. At a larger scale, The rest of the world used to complain that it was always having to hear about US products like Coca Cola, Levi's. big American cars, and the like. But US domestic car production is now about 7% of the global total. US companies are producing around the world: for example, General Motors makes more cars in China than in the US, and US producers make and sell twice as much inside China as they export to China.
Just how terrible is this, you may ask? On an economic basis, it's hard to see the problem here. That's not "geopolitical" anyway. You can read Tim more darkly,

...in 21st century, when it comes a wide array of decisions--international trade talks, decisions of the the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, who leads the way during global financial crises, who dominates the flows of international investment capital and foreign aid, who has the power to impose trade or financial sanctions, and what kind of military threats are most credible--the shifts in the global economy suggest that the high-income countries of the world will not dominate as they did during most of the 20th century. Instead, countries with the world's largest economies, but much lower standard of living for their populations, will play a central role in setting the rules.
That is the distinct possibility. But trying to keep them desperately poorer than us while we grow slowly so we can lord it over them at the IMF is clearly not the answer. A billion Chinese exiting desperate poverty is about the best thing that has happened to overall human welfare in a long time. Go to India and ask yourself "should we really keep these people from living decent lives so we can be the global big shots?" What is the answer -- beyond aggressively returning to a pro-growth economic agenda?

Ideas are non-rival. This is the central idea (itself nonrival) of new economic growth theory, and Paul Romer's Nobel prize. If you use my car, I can't use it. If you use my idea, that doesn't stop me from using it. Political ideas are non-rival as well. This will happen, and it is bloody important that these people think like us and share our freedom-minded political and social visions when they earn their seat at the table.

Again, the EU comes to mind. Devastated at the end of WWII, and the source of what we now call geopolitical tensions for centuries, as well as immense exporter of bad political ideas. It also had an "economic miracle" of catch-up growth, before leveling out somewhat below US prosperity, as a result of its higher taxes and regulations, and growing in tandem since. Overall EU GDP is larger than ours. This process, adroitly managed by wise people on both sides, such as the recently departed President Bush I, over often fearsome obstacles, should be the model of what to do with China, India and Brazil.

However, the two are linked. The US right now does not look to much of the world like a great model for growth-inducing political ideas.

Meanwhile, speaking of trade fallacies, one of President Trump's recent tweets echoed another common fallacy:

When people or countries come in to raid the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so.
Uh, taking wealth and putting it on boats and taking it away is calledexports. And fortunately the sellers of such goods are already pretty good at making people pay for that privilege.

Much less reported, in checking this quote I found later on the President's twitter stream

Ultimately, I believe, we will be making a deal - either now or into the future....
Let us hope so. Alas bad ideas are non-rival too, and let us hope that the bad ideas cast about to make us look like the scary crazy negotiator don't stick too long in the process.

(Deep apologies to both Scott Sumner and Tim Taylor for an unbelievable brain fade in the first version of this post. Scott has also been writing interesting posts about China that I haven't had time to review. Apologies also to commenters whose thoughtful comments disappeared along with the erroneous post. There is no way to fix the title of a post alas.)

22 Jun 2020

Trade uncertainty and investment - Barokong

My colleague Steve Davis has a nice post quantifying economic uncertainty due to the trade war, and its emerging impact on investment.

Steve (and Nick Bloom) have done a great job quantifying policy uncertainty over time. To be clear, policies can have two effects -- there is the certainty of damaging policy, but there is also the damaging uncertainty of what policy will be. If a trade war seems to be looming, and you don't know if you will get tariff protection (raw steel) or be hurt by the tariff (steel users, competing with tariff-free steel products from abroad), that's uncertainty. Businesses hold off investing when they know things will be bad. But they also hold off when they're not sure what will happen. That's uncertainty.

Our little (so far) trade war is full of uncertainty

Trade policy under the Trump administration also has a capricious, back-and-forth character... Less than three months after withdrawing from the TPP, the President said he would consider rejoining for a substantially better deal, only to throw cold water on the idea a few days later. Initially, the administration justified steel tariffs on the laughable grounds that Canada, for example, presents a national security threat. Later, President Trump tweeted that tariffs on Canadian steel were a response to its tariffs on dairy products. Some countries get tariff exemptions, some don’t. Exemptions vary in duration, and they come and go in a head-spinning manner. Two days ago (August 10), the President tweeted that he “just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum with respect to Turkey” for reasons unclear. For a fuller account of tariff to-ing and fro-ing under the Trump administration, see the Peterson Institute’s “Trump Trade War Timeline.”
The arbitrariness, including the waivers, means

Crony capitalism, political favoritism, and extra sand in the gears of commerce – here we come!
But to the point, what's the Davis-Bloom quantitative measure of uncertainty doing? Answer: it is higher than even around the election -- whose outcome, and the nature of the Trump presidency certainly led to a vast amount of uncertainty.

As of July, this uncertainty is only having a small effect on investment, and the economy is still booming -- in my view from the corporate tax rate cuts and deregulation efforts. It is true that the US is so big that most of the economy does not live on exports or directly compete with imports.

Let’s sum up the U.S. survey evidence: About one-fifth of firms in the July 2018 SBU say they are reassessing capital expenditure plans in light of tariff worries. Among this one-fifth, firms have reassessed an average 60 percent of capital expenditures previously planned for 2018–19. ..Only 6 percent of the firms in our full sample report cutting or deferring previously planned capital expenditures in reaction to tariff worries. These findings suggest that tariff worries have had only a small negative effect on U.S. business investment to date.
But it could get worse. Steve closes with a nice list of recent trade outbursts from our part of the economics blog world:

In closing, I should note that the harmful consequences of tariff hikes and trade policy uncertainty extend well beyond short-term investment effects. For other critiques of the Trumpian approach to trade policy, see the worthy commentaries byRobert Barro,Alan Blinder,John Cochrane,Doug Irwin,Mary Lovely and Yang Liang,Greg Mankiw andAdam Posen, among others.

18 Jun 2020

Trade and the Fed - Barokong

Nina Karnaukh of Ohio State sent along this lovely graph of the 6 month Fed Funds futures around the beginning of August. Read this as the market's guess about what is happening to the Federal Funds rate over the next 6 months.

The first drop in price occurs with the FOMC announcement 2 PM July 31. The price drop is equivalent to a a rise in expected future interest rates of about 5 basis points or 0.05%. This has been read as market disappointment that the Fed did not signal more future rate cuts.

The subsequent price spike is this,

That statement caused a 10 bps rise in price, i.e. decline in expected interest rate.  The natural interpretation: The markets expect the  Fed to lower rates in a trade war, either directly or in response to the economic damage the trade war will cause.

I had read the Fed's recent actions as just a case of late expansion jitters, perhaps with a mild response  to slightly lowered inflation. But this is clear evidence that the market sees the Fed reacting to trade news.

************

Should central banks offset trade wars? I think this is a question nobody is asking but it needs to be asked. Central banks including the US Fed and ECB seem to take for granted that any reduction in economic activity demands "stimulus" to offset it. But stimulus can only provide "aggregate demand." What if the problem is "aggregate supply" -- an economy humming along at full demand, and then someone throws a wrench in the works, be it a trade war, a bad tax code, or a regulatory onslaught? (I'll stop using quotes, to signal my dislike for these terms.)

Conventional wisdom ways that central banks should not offset reductions in aggregate supply. You can fight a lack of aggregate demand, but monetary policy cannot fight a decline in aggregate supply. The first job of a central bank should be to distinguish demand from supply shocks, so it can react to the former, but not to the latter.  This standard wisdom emanates from the 1970s, where central banks kept rates low to offset the effects of oil price shocks -- supply shocks -- and ended up producing worse recessions and inflation.

Yet expressing this view at central banks these days, people stare at me with blank expressions. Distinguish... supply... from... demand... shocks....why would we do that? The view from about 1960s Keynesianism that all fluctuations in output, employment and prices come from demand, seems to have flowered again.

Now, in this conventional (i.e. 1980 Keynesianism vs 1965 Keynesianism) view the problem with offsetting a "supply" shock is that the monetary stimulus causes inflation. And now we have inflation once again drifting slightly lower. So perhaps the trade war is a "demand" shock? It's hard to see how though.

More plausibly, perhaps the policy uncertainty about the trade war is causing a decline in "demand." Why build a factory if any day now another tweet  could render it unprofitable? The prospect of a trade war -- or the kind of serious political and trade turmoil that would follow Tianamen II in Hong Kong -- is a "confidence" shock. But the uncertainty is genuine. A rise in risk premium in an uncertain environment is genuine. People should hold off building factories that depend on a Chinese supply chain until we know if there is going to be a trade war. Unless the Fed is stepping more and more into the role of psychologist in chief, to decree that such fears are irrational, it's not obvious that the Fed should try to goose investment by artificially lowering the short term rate in response to a  rise in trade fears.

A second possibility arises from more 1980s economics. A "supply" or productivity shock also lowers the expected return on investment. So the real  interest rate should decline in response to such a shock. That is another reason perhaps for some interest rate decline in response to a negative supply shock. But how much? This still does not justify the same response to all sources of output decline, or (in our case) fear of output decline that has not happened yet.

The other possibility is that the Fed is now watching the exchange rate, as most other central banks do. The one thing that still does seem to work is that raising interest rates raises the value of the currency. The trade war raises the value of the dollar, and the US clearly wants to manipulate the dollar back down again.

Institutionalized nonsense - Barokong

When, last week, the Treasury issued its currency manipulation report, I thought it was a joke. Treasury put Germany and Italy on its "monitoring list" of countries suspected of "currency manipulation."

Germany and Italy are, of course, part of the Euro, the whole point of which is that they cannot, individually, "manipulate" their currencies, whatever that means. It is precisely this inability to devalue -- to "manipulate" the Drachma to regain "competitiveness" (another meaningless term) -- that conventional wisdom bemoaned of Greece.

I had a little chuckle, envisioning some frustrated mid-level Treasury economist bemoaning the trade and currency idiocy floating around Washington, putting this little message in a bottle to see if anyone noticed the reductio ad absurdum.  If so, hello there, somebody noticed.

But then  read the report.

It is shocking. It's supposed to be about "currency manipulation." The statutory mandate is clear (p. 3):

Under Section 3004 of the 1988 Act, the Secretary must: “consider whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.”
Whatever "unfair competitive advantage" means -- remember, trade is trade, not a basketball game, and only is done if it benefits both parties -- this sounds pretty clear: it's about currencies. If you don't have a currency, you can't manipulate it. The additional statutory guidance quoted on p. 3 also all ends with "currency."

This minor technicality will no longer constrain our Treasury, in its desire to dictate trade. In big bold letters on p. 2

"Starting with this Report, Treasury will review and assess developments in a larger number of trading partners in order to monitor for external imbalances and one-sided intervention."
(Just what is a "two-sided intervention?" Exchange rates that go both up and down?) More specifically,

Beginning with this Report, Treasury will assess all U.S. trading partners whose bilateral goods trade with the United States exceeds $40 billion annually.
(My emphasis.)

Bilateral trade "deficits" are meaningless. China sends us shoes, Australia sends China coal, the US sends Australia airplanes. Pieces of paper flow the other way. We all come out ahead despite three bilateral "deficits." (In quotes as this is a horrible word too, implying something is deficient every time you go to the Starbucks and suffer a coffee trade "deficit." )

Bilateralgoods deficits are even more meaningless. Italians send us prosciutto (goods), we send them software (services), and this is somehow a problem reflecting "currency manipulation?"

Italy's sins, meriting "monitoring:"

Italy recorded a current account surplus of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2018, while its goods trade surplus with the United States rose to $32 billion.
Aha, Italy, that dynamic powerhouse, is growing exponentially, at the expense of all those unemployed pasta makers in Appalachia, because it somehow devalued its corner of the Euro?*

Italy should be running big trade surpluses. That is the only way it will pay down its vast foreign debt. If Italy were running tradedeficits we should worry.

Here is the whole table of "criteria."

And thus we get to the madness that a country without its own currency can be accused of its manipulation.

The only possible conclusion: Treasury now wants to jawbone countries into directly controlling bilateral trade in goods.

My  secretly sane economist at Treasury did, then, sneak in a pretty good description of Italy's problems:

Italy’s competitiveness continues to suffer from stagnant productivity and rising labor costs. The country needs to undertake fundamental structural reforms to raise long-term growth – consistent with reducing high unemployment and public debt – and safeguard fiscal and external sustainability.
Yes. But "fiscal and external sustainability" is not about recycling your Gucci bags. It means running trade surpluses with which to pay down debts! This report now flatly contradicts itself.  Then, in case you need banging over the head about how there cannot be a whiff of manipulation here,

The ECB has not intervened unilaterally in foreign currency markets since 2001,
a phrase repeated poetically regarding the other suspect countries, Ireland and Germany.

I called this post "institutionalized nonsense." Yes, every president brings to his (or, someday, her) Administration some nutty ideas, some campaign rhetoric that does not correspond to cause-and-effect reality. Sensible cabinet secretaries and career staff must indulge the rhetoric.

But by this document the Treasury is institutionalizing nuttiness -- setting up rules and procedures that monitor bilateral goods "deflcits,"  and waste our Nation's vanishing prestige haranguing countries about their "macroeconomic policies" that produce such undefined and ill-measured ephemera. Why listen to us on, say Iran sanctions or Tiananmen square if we are going to indulge in this sort of nuttiness?

Meanwhile, the administration continues to badger the Fed to lower interest rates in order to... well, to manipulate our currency!

*Note to the humorless: I don't mean to disparage Italy, actually the home of excellent small manufacturers. Also, if Italy does introduce MiniBots, or go off the Euro then the fun might really begin. But the Treasury report is not about this. Next post.

Update: Tim Worrstall and Don Boudreaux cover the same report. Tim points out that the US runs bilateral goods trade surpluses with lots of countries, who by rights should be accusing us of "currency manipulation"

... the United States has goods trade surpluses with some places. Like, say, the Netherlands. Or Hong Kong. Or Belgium. Each of those places the US has a goods trade surplus with over $20 billion a year ...
So, by the new US rules Holland, Hong Kong and Belgium should be declaring the United States a currency manipulator and imposing corrective tariffs to compensate, should they? You know, sauce for goose, sauce for gander. And if you’re not willing to use the same criteria then you’d better have a damn good explanation why.
Don concludes that "we Americans are today governed by imbeciles." I guess I am a little optimistic in my view that by making it so ridiculous -- by including countries on the euro -- some small point of light at Treasury was making fun of the whole mess.

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